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Counterfactual reasoning is valid reasoning arising from premises that are true in a hypothetical model, but false in
actuality. Investigations of counterfactuals have concentrated on reasoning and production, but psycholinguistic
research has been more limited. We report three eye-movement studies investigating the comprehension of counterfac-
tual information. Prior context depicted a counterfactual world (CW), or real world (RW), while a second sentence was
manipulated to create RW anomalous continuations, where events included a violation of RW knowledge, and RW
congruent continuations, where the events described were congruent with RW knowledge. Results showed that RW
violations can be ‘neutralised’ within an appropriate pre-specified CW context, and RW congruent items can lead to
the experience of an anomaly following an inconsistent CW context. Importantly, there was also evidence in all three
studies for early processing difficulty with RW violations regardless of prior context, indicating that a proposition is
rapidly evaluated against real-world knowledge, just prior to the accommodation of a proposition into a counterfactual
world representation. We discuss the results in terms of a variety of accounts of the nature of counterfactual worlds.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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events that are counter to reality, or false, is an essential
ingredient of our everyday cognition. Counterfactual sit-
uations are frequently depicted through language, yet
surprisingly little is known of how they are processed
during reading or listening. In this paper, we attempt
an exploration of counterfactual processing during read-
ing. Counterfactuals are cases of possibly valid reason-
ing from premises that are false in actuality
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understand a counterfactual statement, such as, If
money grew on trees then we’d all be millionaires by keep-
ing in mind two possibilities from the outset: the conjec-
ture, money grows on trees and we are all millionaires,
and the presupposed facts, money does not grow on trees
and we are not all millionaires (Byrne & Tasso, 1999).
The counterfactual thus requires that a person represent
false information that is temporarily supposed to be
true. Linguistic analyses have catalogued a number of
ways in which counterfactual worlds may be triggered,
including modal terms such as could, and might, and
if-then constructions. It is also known that tense influ-
ences the plausibility of counterfactual interpretationed.
A. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
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paper, we rely on If-then constructions that clearly can
signal a counterfactual world for consideration.
There has been a very large amount of research on
reasoning with counterfactuals (c.f., Byrne, 2002), and
on what sort of constraints there are on the kinds of
counterfactual thoughts people are likely to generate in
a variety of circumstances (e.g., Byrne, 1997; Kahneman
&Miller, 1986; Markman & Tetlock, 2000). Counterfac-
tuals are ubiquitous in cognitive activities, ranging from
simple imagination beyond reality, and fantasy (e.g.,
Sternberg & Gastel, 1989) to the exploration of possibil-
ities in deductive reasoning (e.g., Byrne & Tasso, 1999;
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). They serve important
social functions, for instance in reflecting on past events
with negative outcomes [the ‘‘if-only..’’ effect; of Kahn-
eman and Tversky (1982); see also Byrne, 2007; John-
son-Laird and Byrne, 1991; Kahneman, 1995].
In contrast to research within the framework of rea-
soning and its social concomitants, there has been very
little research on how counterfactuals are understood
during language comprehension, for instance of what
kinds of representations they set up. One approach is
that of mental spaces, described by Fauconnier (1985,
1997). Mental spaces are defined as structured, incre-
mental sets that include elements and relationships
between them, with availability for new elements to be
added and new interactions between the elements to be
created. Mental spaces, and the relationships between
them, are a way of specifying an interpretation of a dis-
course. According to Fauconnier, two mental spaces are
produced in the case of counterfactual conditionals; one
is the reality space and the other is the counterfactual
hypothetical space. He sees counterfactuality as a case
of forced incompatibility between these two spaces, since
what is true in the counterfactual space is false in the
reality space. Although Fauconnier presents some very
interesting analyses of what is entailed with counterfac-
tual worlds, his analyses do not really provide any basis
for predicting how propositions are processed with
respect to real world and counterfactual world spaces.
A similar psychological account of reasoning, the
mental model theory, has been proposed (Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). This theory
has a ‘‘core’’ extensional account of conditionals, mak-
ing a conditional ‘if p then q’ logically equivalent to
‘not-p or q’. Consequently, in the case of counterfactual
conditionals, it is proposed that both factual and coun-
terfactual possibilities are represented by the reader. An
alternative view that has gained increasing interest was
initiated by Ramsey (1931), who proposed that when
comprehending a conditional statement, people ‘‘hypo-
thetically add p to their stock of knowledge and argue
on that basis about q’’. This practice is commonly
known as the Ramsey test. Recent literature has chal-
lenged the mental model theory (Evans & Over, 2004;Please cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jmEvans, Over, & Handley, 2002). As an alternative,
authors suggest a suppositional theory where a condi-
tional of the form ‘‘if p then q’’ directs attention to pos-
sibilities following from p, and not to ‘‘not-p or q’’
possibilities. Therefore, counterfactual statements
should be evaluated with respect to suppositional or
hypothetical possibilities first.
The present paper is an attempt to examine the role
played by real-world (factual) knowledge, and inferences
from counterfactual worlds during on-line comprehen-
sion of simple statements. We illustrate the problem with
a simple example. In the real world, it is anomalous to
say (1):
(1) If the cat is hungry, the owner could feed the cat
carrots and it would happily gobble them down.
If a counterfactual world is set up through a state-
ment like (2), then statement (1) is not anomalous with
respect to that counterfactual world, although it remains
so with respect to the real world.
(2) It would be great if cats were vegetarian.
According to the mental model theory, people have
to keep in mind both the conjecture If cats were vegetar-
ians then (1), and the presupposed facts that cats are not
vegetarian and do not like carrots (e.g., Byrne & Tasso,
1999). Similarly, according to Fauconnier (1985, 1994),
two spaces reflecting the real and the counterfactual
world are set up. However, according to the supposi-
tional theory, people would hypothetically suppose that
cats are vegetarians and then judge their degree of confi-
dence in feeding cats a bowl of carrots given that suppo-
sition. If the conditional probability was high, they
would confidently believe the statement and accept it.
Conversely, if the conditional probability was low, they
would have doubts about the statement and either reject
it or initiate further inferences in order to determine
whether it could be consistent with the counterfactual
scenario. Although it is undoubtedly true that ultimately
a proper appreciation of counterfactuals requires knowl-
edge about both real and counterfactual worlds, it is
unclear whether the two would both be present simulta-
neously in a representation of the discourse model asso-
ciated with the introduction of a counterfactual
situation, or whether there would be a sequential pro-
cess, in which the counterfactual was temporarily
accepted as the true world, and sometime later the con-
sequences of this are tested against the true world for
inference. This immediately gives rise to a processing
question: can something that is anomalous given our
real-world knowledge be ‘‘neutralised’’ as an anomaly
if it is consistent within a pre-specified counterfactual
world context? According to the model theories of rea-A. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
l.2007.06.007
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delayed so that it initially leads to typical anomaly detec-
tion responses, and later becomes accommodated by the
counterfactual world representation. Alternatively, the
counterfactual world may be the only discourse repre-
sentation against which a following statement is evalu-
ated, and so if an inferential statement follows from
the counterfactual world, it would not show as anoma-
lous immediately (though there might be later conse-
quences). This is the basic question of the present
paper. Therefore, for the remainder of this paper, the
term ‘anomaly’ will be used with reference to real-world
expectancies, while ‘consistency’ will be used to refer to
the level of consistency with the prior context.
We present three eye-tracking experiments in which
the materials utilize propositions that are anomalous
with respect to the real world, but not with respect to
some counterfactual world. The question was whether
a counterfactual setting, making the anomaly accept-
able, would result in the removal of all difficulties asso-
ciated with the anomaly occurring in the absence of a
counterfactual setting, or whether there would still be
a difficulty observed because the proposition is com-
pared with real-world information despite the counter-
factual setting.
Clear semantic and pragmatic anomalies have effects
on the eye-tracking record. Thus, pragmatic anomalies
like (3) have been found to induce longer reading times
prior to a gradual increase in regressive eye-movements,
reaching a maximum at the sentence conclusion (Braze,
Shankweiler, Ni, & Palumbo, 2002; Ni, Fodor, Crain, &
Shankweiler, 1998).
(3) This exotic spice might possibly seek the subtle fla-
vour she craves.
In another study, Rayner, Warren, Juhasz, and Liv-
ersedge (2004) compared anomalous, implausible, and
plausible sentences using eye-tracking. The results
showed evidence of differential processing with anoma-
lous target words leading to immediate disruption in
gaze duration on critical words, while implausible target
words showed considerably delayed effects. So, eye-
tracking is a useful tool for investigating the time-course
of disruption effects due to anomalies, and provides evi-
dence for the early detection of anomalies. Event-related
potential (ERP) studies likewise show that pragmatically
anomalous words are detected as soon as they occur.
The processing of semantic information influences the
amplitude of a negative-going ERP component between
roughly 250 and 550 ms, and with maximal amplitude at
about 400 ms (e.g., Kutas & Hillyard, 1980), the well-
documented N400 effect. The N400 has been observed
with both word-by-word written presentation, and in lis-
tening to continuous speech (e.g., Conolly & Phillips,Please cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jm1994; Holcomb & Neville, 1990; Kutas & Kluender,
1994). In fact, a large N400 is the default for words that
are unpredicatable, or do not fit a context well. Various
degrees of contextual support reduce this effect (Kutas,
Van Petten, & Kluender, 2006). An important effect
was demonstrated by Van Berkum, Hagoort, and Brown
(1999), who used ERPs to investigate semantic integra-
tion of information in text. Participants were presented
with short stories, some of which contained a critical
word that, although acceptable in the local sentence con-
text, was semantically anomalous with respect to the
wider discourse (4).
(4) Jane told her brother that he was exceptionally
slow.
While the word slow is not anomalous in this sentence,
it becomes anomalous when (4) follows a discourse con-
text highlighting the idea that Jane’s brother had been
very quick, in fact. Relative to coherent control words,
the discourse-dependent context anomalies elicited a
large N400 effect, similar in surface form to pragmatic
anomalies, showing that immediate anomaly detection
is not confined to the constraints of the local sentence.
In the remainder of the paper, we present an eye-track-
ing study in which we examine the pattern of disruption
caused by the use of words that are anomalous in real-
world contexts (RW anomalous), but are not anomalous
with respect to some counterfactual world (CW congru-
ent), compared the use of a word that is not anomalous
in the real world (RW congruent). The two further eye-
tracking studies expand on the initial findings.Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Thirty-six participants from the undergraduate popu-
lation of Glasgow University were paid to take part in
the study. All participants were native speakers of Eng-
lish, who did not have dyslexia and with vision that they
reported to be normal or corrected to normal using soft
contact lenses. Participants were naı¨ve to the purpose of
the study and had no previous exposure to the test
materials.
Materials and design
Twenty-four experimental items were constructed as
in Table 1. In each condition, the first sentence acts as
a context. In the RW-inconsistent condition, the first
sentence introduces a setting that fits with the real world.
The second sentence is then inconsistent, in that the
critical word, carrots, does not fit RW expectations.A. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
l.2007.06.007
Table 1
Examples of experimental sentences (Experiment 1)
RW-inconsistent
If cats are hungry they usually pester their owners until they get fed
Families could feed their cat a bowl of carrots and it would gobble it down happily
Cats are loving pets when you look after them well
RW-consistent
If cats are hungry they usually pester their owners until they get fed
Families could feed their cat a bowl of fish and it would gobble it down happily
Cats are loving pets when you look after them well
CW-consistent
If cats were vegetarians they would be cheaper for owners to look after
Families could feed their cat a bowl of carrots and it would gobble it down happily
Cats are loving pets when you look after them well
4 H.J. Ferguson, A.J. Sanford / Journal of Memory and Language xxx (2007) xxx–xxx
ARTICLE IN PRESSIn the RW-consistent case, the first sentence sets up a
proposition that fits with the real world, and the critical
word of the second sentence is changed to one that fits
with RW (fish, instead of carrots). In the case of the
CW material, this first sentence introduced a counterfac-
tual world. The second sentence then contained a state-
ment that is consistent with the CW (. . .could feed their
cat a bowl of carrots. . ..). The basic design is aimed at
comparing the eye-tracking record in response to carrots
under the inconsistent and consistent conditions with
each other, and with fish in the consistent condition.
The critical nouns were matched across conditions
for length, and for frequency using the British National
Corpus and no significant differences were found. The
nouns in CW-consistent and RW-inconsistent condi-
tions averaged 5.96 (min = 3, max = 9) characters, while
the nouns in RW-consistent conditions averaged 6.0
(min = 3, max = 11) characters. The nouns in CW-con-
sistent and RW-inconsistent conditions averaged 81.1
appearances per million words, whereas the nouns in
RW-consistent conditions averaged 63.0 appearances
per million words. Hence, any difference in reading times
between conditions will not to be due to discrepancies in
length or frequency of the nouns.
One version of each item was assigned to one of three
presentation lists, with each list containing 24 experi-
mental items, eight in each of the three conditions,
blocked to ensure that they were evenly distributed. By
rotation over the three lists, all materials appeared in
all conditions, but in only one condition within a list.
In addition, 82 filler materials of different types were
added to each list. Twelve participants were randomly
assigned to read each list. The 24 experimental items
in each list were interspersed randomly among the 82 fil-
ler sentences to create a single random order and each
subject only saw each target sentence once, in one of
the three conditions. At least 1 filler item intervened
between each experimental item. Comprehension ques-
tions followed half of the experimental (i.e., 12) and 41
of the filler trials. Participants did not receive feedbackPlease cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jmfor their responses to these questions. Only participants
scoring at or above 90% accuracy on the comprehension
questions were used in the data analysis.
Eye-tracking
Participants’ eye-movements were recorded during
reading using a Forward Technology Dual Purkinje gen-
eration 5.5 eye-tracker. The eye-tracker recorded partic-
ipants’ gaze location and movement from the right eye,
although viewing was binocular. Recordings were taken
every millisecond. A forehead rest and head strap, along
with a bite-bar, were used to stabilize participants’ head
position and to minimise interference to the signal
caused by head movements. All sentences were pre-
sented in size 10 Courier New font style through a PC,
on a VDU screen, 60 cm from the participants’ eyes.
Procedure
The eye-tracker was calibrated using a series of nine
fixed targets distributed across the display, during which
the participant was asked to fixate on each point on the
computer screen as they appeared in order to establish
the correlation between x/y voltages and screen position.
Calibration was monitored and adjustments to the cali-
bration were made throughout the experiment as
necessary.
Prior to the presentation of each sentence, a pattern
of fixation points appeared on the screen, spanning the
position to be occupied by the sentences. Participants
were instructed to fixate on a sequence of fixation points
ending at the top left side, where the first character of the
text would be displayed. Once this calibration check was
completed accurately, the experimenter pressed a button
to advance the screen to display the next item. This pro-
cedure ensured that participants were consistently track-
ing well, and that eye-movement records began
uniformly with the initial words in each sentence.
Adjustments to the calibration were made at this stage
if necessary. Materials appeared individually on the
screen, spanning a maximum of four lines of text, withA. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
l.2007.06.007
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of 75 characters per line. Participants were instructed
to read at their normal rate and to read to comprehend
the sentences, in order to answer the questions. After
reading each sentence, they pressed a button that led
to the presentation of a comprehension question or the
next trial. Comprehension questions followed 50% of
target and filler trials in a pseudo-random order. Partic-
ipants responded to the questions by clicking either the
button in their left hand or the button in their right hand
when given a choice of two answers on either left or right
side of the screen. Adjustments to the calibration were
made during the experiment when the experimenter
deemed it necessary.Results and discussion
Regions of analysis
The critical second sentence was divided into
four regions for the purpose of aggregating reading
times and classifying eye-movements, as shown in
(5). For each sentence frame, corresponding regions
contained the same number of words in all three
versions.
(5) If cats were vegetarians they would be cheaper for
owners to look after. ŒFamilies could1Œ feed their
cat a bowl of2Œ carrots and3Œ it would gobble it
down happily.4Œ Cats are loving pets when you
look after them well.
The first sentence created a RW or CW context for
the critical sentence. Region 1 introduced an agent fol-
lowed by the modal verb could. Region 2 (pre-critical)
contained material that that led to the critical region.
Region 3 (critical) always consisted of the inconsistent
or consistent noun, plus the connective and, and thus
this region was always two words long. Region 4
(post-critical) comprised the critical sentence wrap-up.
The following measures were used to analyse the
tracking patterns. First-pass reading time, the sum of
the duration of fixations made on first entering a region
of text until an eye-movement exits the region to either
the left or right. First-pass reading times can provide
an indication of the difficulty experienced when partici-
pants initially process a region of text. First-pass regres-
sions out is the sum of regressive saccades made from the
current most rightward fixation with a region of text,
indicating the degree to which left to right movement
was disrupted during the first sweep of the eyes through
a region of text. By examining the location of this dis-
ruption it is possible to establish particular regions in
a text that cause difficulty for semantic processing.
Regression path times is the sum of fixations from the
first entry into that region from the left to the time the
region was first exited to the right. This measure includesPlease cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jmfixations made to re-inspect earlier portions of text and
therefore provides an indication of the time spent re-
reading after the initial detection of a problem. Total
reading time is the sum of the of all fixations made
within a region and provides an indication of the overall
amount of time spent processing text in that region.
Finally, regressions-in convey information on the per-
cent of regressive movements from the right into each
region and consequently present researchers with details
of the regions of text that readers need to revisit in order
to make sense of a piece of text.
An automatic procedure pooled short contiguous fix-
ations. Fixations shorter than 80 ms were integrated
with larger adjacent fixations within one character and
fixations shorter than 40 ms that were not within three
characters of another fixation were excluded. Fixations
longer than 1200 ms were truncated. Trials where partic-
ipants failed to read the sentence or there had been
tracker loss were eliminated prior to analysis. Specifi-
cally, trials where two or more adjacent regions had zero
first-pass reading times were removed, which accounted
for less than 1% of the data for any of the experiments
reported here.
Table 2 displays mean values for each measure in
each condition and region.
First-pass reading times. In critical region 3, first-pass
reading times showed a significant difference over condi-
tions [F1(2,35) = 5.2, p < .01; F2(2,23) = 3.7, p = .03].
Further analysis using Bonferroni comparisons showed
that RW-inconsistent sentences resulted in significantly
longer first-pass reading times than RW-consistent sen-
tences (t1(35) = 2.8, p < .05; t2(23) = 2.4, p < .05). Thus
the effect of anomaly in the RW context is as predicted,
and appears in an early measure. However, sentences in
the CW-consistent conditions led to longer first-pass
reading times than those in the RW-consistent condition
(t1(35) = 2.8, p < .05; t2(23) = 2.3, p < .05). Further-
more, there were no differences between CW-consistent
and RW-inconsistent conditions (ts < 0.2). This early
measure thus provides evidence that violations of real-
world knowledge are important whether they appear
as a direct violation (in the RW-inconsistent condition)
or in the context of a counterfactual (the CW-consistent
condition, which is of course RW—violating). Thus,
there is evidence that real-world violations were not neu-
tralised by a counterfactual context. These data are illus-
trated in Fig. 1. Even within a counterfactual context,
participants appear to still automatically process infor-
mation in terms of their real-world knowledge.
In the post-critical region there were no effects of
condition on first pass reading times [Fs < 1.2].
First-pass regressions out. Fig. 2 illustrates how each
condition affected the mean first-pass regressions out
of each region as the sentence progressed.A. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
l.2007.06.007
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First-pass reading time (ms)
RW-inconsistent 3207 (159.5) 504 (27.2) 833 (43.7) 327 (11.9) 856 (48.2)
RW-consistent 3132 (153.1) 473 (27.7) 804 (39.6) 296 (9.7) 890 (33.0)
CW-consistent 3357 (162.7) 485 (31.1) 740 (28.4) 328 (12.4) 912 (40.7)
Regression path time (ms)
RW-inconsistent 3207 (159.5) 589 (32.1) 1026 (40.4) 453 (24.5) 1379 (95.0)
RW-consistent 3131 (153.1) 567 (39.2) 1057 (57.9) 389 (17.3) 1074 (67.0)
CW-consistent 3357 (162.7) 577 (35.0) 977 (36.2) 413 (14.9) 1082 (69.2)
First-pass regressions out (%)
RW-inconsistent — 7.8(1.6) 18.4 (2.4) 23.3 (3.0) 31.6 (3.9)
RW-consistent — 6.9 (1.6) 17.3 (2.0) 21.8 (2.9) 11.8 (2.4)
CW-consistent — 9.0 (1.4) 19.8 (3.1) 17.5 (2.6) 8.8 (2.2)
Total reading time (ms)
RW-inconsistent 3398 (191.1) 612 (33.7) 1233 (67.5) 504 (30.4) 1184 (49.0)
RW-consistent 3345 (177.2) 555 (31.9) 1055 (52.7) 357 (14.8) 1029 (36.4)
CW-consistent 3545 (175.8) 604 (39.3) 985 (36.4) 385 (17.1) 1036 (50.2)
Regressions-in (%)
RW-inconsistent 13.8 (2.1) 26.2 (3.0) 40.2 (3.6) 23.9 (3.2) 5.8 (1.3)
RW-consistent 15.6 (2.6) 22.3 (2.8) 24.4 (2.8) 9.7 (2.2) 6.4 (1.7)










Sentence 1 Region 1 Region 2 Critical
Region 3


















Fig. 2. Percentage first-pass regressions out, Experiment 1.























Fig. 1. Mean first-pass reading times in critical region for
Experiment 1, showing standard error bars.
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Please cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jmIn the critical region 3, there was no evidence of any
effect of condition on regressions out [Fs < 1.8]. In the
post-critical region 4, clear effects emerged amongst con-
ditions [F1(2,35) = 24.0, p < .001; F2(2,23) = 24.7,
p < .001]. Planned contrasts showed more first-pass
regressions for the RW-inconsistent condition than the
RW-consistent condition (t1(35) = 5.5, p < .001;
t2(23) = 5.6, p < .001), and for the RW-inconsistent con-
dition than the CW-consistent condition (t1(35) = 6.4,
p < .001; t2(23) = 6.5, p < .001). However, no significant
difference was found between CW-consistent and RW-
consistent conditions with this measure (ts < 1.3). This
data suggests that by the time readers encounter the
post-critical region, they are already using the CW con-
text to make a real-world anomaly acceptable.
Regression path times. Regression path times showed a
difference between conditions in the critical region 3
[F1(2,35) = 4.3, p = .02; F2(2,23) = 3.7, p = .03]. The
RW-inconsistent condition led to longer regression path
times than the RW-consistent condition (t1(35) = 2.9,
p < .05; t2(23) = 2.7, p < .05), as expected. However,
there was no reliable difference between the RW-incon-
sistent and CW-consistent conditions (ts < 1.8), or
between the RW-consistent and the CW-consistent con-
ditions (ts < 1.1) on this measure. This may be because
the CW-consistent condition is still being checkedA. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
l.2007.06.007
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up in the number of regressions out of region 3. The fact
that readers are regressing equally often, but spending
more time re-reading in the RW-inconsistent condition
suggests differential recovery and integration strategies
for RW-inconsistent and CW-consistent conditions fol-
lowing a real-world anomaly.
Differences over conditions in the post-critical region
4 reflect a clearer effect of processing on the basis of prior
context. The three conditions differ from one another,
[F1(2,35) = 25.1, p < .001; F2(2,23) = 12.6, p < .001],
and times were longer following the RW-inconsistent
than RW-consistent condition (t1(35) = 6.2, p < .001;
t2(23) = 4.4, p < .001) and longer for RW-inconsistent
than the CW-consistent condition (t1(35) = 6.1,
p < .001; t2(23) = 6.1, p < .001). No differences were
found between RW-consistent and CW-consistent condi-
tions (ts < 0.2). As with the regressions out measure, this
suggests that by the post-critical region, readers are using
the CW context to ‘neutralise’ the RW violation.
Total reading times. Reading times in the pre-critical
region 2 showed a significant difference between condi-
tions [F1(2,35) = 16.5, p < .001; F2(2,23) = 17.4,
p < .001]. There were longer total reading times in the
RW-inconsistent condition than the RW-consistent con-
dition (t1(35) = 4.0, p < .001; t2(23) = 4.1, p < .001) and
longer in the RW-inconsistent condition than in the
CW-consistent (t1(35) = 5.6, p < .001; t2(23) = 5.7,
p < .001). The CW-consistent and RW-consistent condi-
tions did not differ (ts < 1.7).
This pattern of total reading times between the condi-
tions persisted in the critical region 3 [F1(2,35) = 23.2,
p < .001; F2(2,23) = 20.2, p < .001] and into the post-
critical region 4 [F1(2,35) = 12.4, p < .001;
F2(2,23) = 7.2, p < .001]. Planned contrasts revealed
longer total reading times in the RW-inconsistent condi-
tion than RW-consistent (region 3, t1(35) = 6.4, p < .001;
t2(23) = 5.9, p < .001; region 4, t1(35) = 4.5, p < .001;
t2(23) = 3.4, p < .001). The RW-inconsistent condition
produced longer times than the CW-consistent (region
3, t1(35) = 5.2, p < .001; t2(23) = 4.9, p < .001; region 4,
t1(35) = 4.1, p < .001; t2(23) = 3.2, p < .001). CW-consis-
tent and RW-consistent did not differ in these regions
(region 3, ts < 1.2; region 4, ts < 0.3).1 Thus, over this
later measure of processing in the pre-critical, critical
and post-critical regions, there is evidence that the RW
anomaly is processed as acceptable following a CW con-1 Number of fixations data mirrored total reading times with
significant differences between conditions in pre-critical
[F1(1,35) = 11.5, p < .001; F2(1,23) = 10.7, p < .001], critical
[F1(1,35) = 16.6, p < .001; F2(1,23) = 16.2, p < .001] and post-
critical [F1(1, 35) = 6.5, p = .004; F2(1, 23) = 3.6, p = .05]
regions, reflecting more fixations in RW-inconsistent and CW-
consistent conditions than RW-consistent.
Please cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jmtext because readers have integrated the CW context into
their current model. In contrast, within a RW context,
this violation leads to processing difficulties.
Regressions in. Fig. 3 shows the mean number of
regressions into each region for each condition.
Significant main effects of condition were detected in
the pre-critical region 2 [F1(2,35) = 12.5, p < .001;
F2(2,23) = 12.4, p < .001] and critical region 3
[F1(2,35) = 21.2, p < .001; F2(2,23) = 17.2, p < .001].
More regressions were made into the pre-critical region
in the RW-inconsistent condition than the RW-consis-
tent (t1(35) = 4.0, p < .001; t2(23) = 4.0, p < .001) and
CW-consistent (t1(35) = 4.6, p < .001; t2(23) = 4.6,
p < .001) conditions. CW-consistent and RW-consistent
conditions did not differ significantly from each other
(ts < 0.6). The critical region replicated this effect as
the RW-inconsistent condition lead to significantly more
regressions in than RW-consistent (t1(35) = 5.2,
p < .001; t2(23) = 4.6, p < .001) and CW-consistent
(t1(35) = 6.0, p < .001; t2(23) = 5.5, p < .001) conditions
that did not differ from each other (ts < 0.9).
To summarise, a significantly longer first-pass read-
ing time was recorded at the critical region for the
CW-consistent and RW-inconsistent conditions com-
pared to RW-consistent. Further, CW-consistent and
RW-inconsistent conditions did not differ from each
other. This result suggests that processing in terms of
real-world knowledge remains active even after the
introduction of a counterfactual world. Thus, the pres-
ent data suggests that statements within the scope of a
counterfactual interpretation are initially evaluated
against real-world knowledge prior to being accommo-
dated within the counterfactual context. Beyond that,
later in processing, and on the basis of all measures con-
sidered, the CW-consistent condition does not differ
from the RW-consistent condition, and only the RW-
inconsistent condition shows a high level of disruption.
This shows that after the initial check against the real
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Fig. 3. Percentage regressions in, Experiment 1.
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The question arises as to whether a word that is
inconsistent with CW, but is consistent with RW would
disrupt processing. It should if CW contexts, when pres-
ent, are indeed adopted as the basis of processing, after
the early use of real-world knowledge. An example of
such an inconsistency is shown in (6) where eating fish
is inconsistent with cats being vegetarians.
(6) If cats were vegetarians they would be cheaper for
owners to look after. Families could feed their cat
a bowl of fish and it would gobble it down
happily.
In Experiment 2, we examined such processing of CW-
inconsistent information that is congruent in terms of the
real world. The aim was to allow a fuller investigation
into whether CW information is processed differently
fromRW information. Additionally, we hoped to explore
whether CW inconsistencies are processed in the same
way as RW inconsistencies, and specifically whether there
is a different pattern or time-course of inconsistency
detection for RW and CW information. We expected to
replicate the findings of Experiment 1, and additionally
to find that the newCW-inconsistent condition led to pro-
cessing difficulties over the CW-consistent condition.
Furthermore, Experiment 2 ensured that the early
effects for RW violations were not the result of semantic
priming.2 Specifically, that information in theCWcontext
sentence was not priming readers’ access to the critical
word in the critical sentence (i.e., carrots being primed
by vegetarians). Therefore in Experiment 2, RW context
sentences contained the samecriticalwordsasCWcontext
sentences, but in a realistic framework, as shown in (7).
(7) Evolution dictates that cats are carnivores and
cows are vegetarians.
In fact, it was not anticipated that the early processing
effect would be eliminated by these changes for two rea-
sons. First, both consistent and inconsistent critical
words have been equally primed in CW context sentences
(i.e., cats primes fish and vegetarians primes carrots). And
secondly, evidence suggests that contextually constrained
words are fixated for less time than words not con-
strained by the semantic context (e.g., Altarriba, Kroll,
Sholl, & Rayner, 1996; Rayner & Well, 1996; Schustack,
Ehrlich, & Rayner, 1987). In contrast, the results
described above showed increased first-pass reading
times in the CW-consistent condition, when the critical
word was constrained by prior CW context.2 We are grateful to Fernanda Ferreira and Simon Garrod for
suggesting this potential problem to us.
Please cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jmMethod
Participants
Thirty-six participants were recruited from the
undergraduate population of students from the Uni-
versity of Glasgow and were paid to participate in
the study. They were selected through the same criteria
as in Experiment 1, and had not taken part in Exper-
iment 1.
Materials and design
Modified versions of the 24 experimental materials
used in Experiment 1, plus eight new items, were used.
The 32 experimental items were as shown in Table 3.
A 2 · 2 within subjects design crossed two context con-
ditions with two consistency conditions. The context
condition was split into two levels: a real world
(RW), where the first sentence depicted a realistic cir-
cumstance, and counterfactual world (CW), where the
first sentence created a counterfactual alternative.
Here, RW context sentences contained the same criti-
cal words as the CW context sentences (e.g., cats
and vegetarians) in a realistic scenario, to eliminate
possible priming effects. The consistency condition also
had two levels and was manipulated by changing the
noun in the second sentence: inconsistent, such that
events described in the second sentence were inconsis-
tent with the prior context; or consistent, whereby the
critical noun was consistent with the pre-specified con-
text. This created a fully crossed experiment with four
conditions: RW-inconsistent, RW-consistent, CW-
inconsistent, and CW-consistent, as shown in Table
3. Note that the third ‘continuation’ sentence from
Experiment 1 was removed for Experiments 2 and 3
for the sake of brevity and since no significant effects
were reported here.
The length and frequency of the critical nouns was
matched across conditions. Nouns in the RW-inconsis-
tent and CW-consistent conditions averaged 5.7
(min = 3, max = 9) characters, while nouns in the RW-
consistent and CW-inconsistent conditions averaged
5.9 (min = 3, max = 11) characters. Mean frequency
was 87.0 occurrences per million words for the RW-
inconsistent and CW-consistent conditions and 64.5
for the RW-consistent and CW-inconsistent conditions.
One version of each item was assigned to one of four
lists. The 32 experimental items were assigned to lists so
that equal numbers of each condition appeared on each
list, with one version of each item appearing on each list,
and so that participants did not see more than one ver-
sion of any given item. The items were displayed with 76
filler sentences of various types. At least 1 filler item
intervened between each experimental item. A compre-
hension question was presented after half of the experi-
mental (i.e., 16) and filler (38) items. Participants did not
receive feedback for their responses. All participantsA. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
l.2007.06.007
Table 3
Examples of experimental sentences (Experiment 2)
RW-inconsistent
Evolution dictates that cats are carnivores and cows are vegetarians
Families could feed their cat a bowl of carrots and it would gobble it down happily
RW-consistent
Evolution dictates that cats are carnivores and cows are vegetarians
Families could feed their cat a bowl offish and it would gobble it down happily
CW-inconsistent
If cats were vegetarians they would be cheaper for owners to look after
Families could feed their cat a bowl offish and it would gobble it down happily
CW-consistent
If cats were vegetarians they would be cheaper for owners to look after
Families could feed their cat a bowl of carrots and it would gobble it down happily
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ARTICLE IN PRESSused in the data analysis scored at or above 90% accu-
racy on the comprehension questions.
Eye-tracking and procedure
The eye-tracking and experimental procedures were
identical to those in Experiment 1.Table 4






First-pass reading time (ms)
RW-inconsistent 3399 (132.2) 493 (24.7)
RW-consistent 3506 (121.2) 480 (22.3)
CW-inconsistent 3686 (169.4) 482 (23.8)
CW-consistent 3667 (161.3) 485 (22.8)
Regression path time (ms)
RW-inconsistent 3400 (132.2) 590 (29.1)
RW-consistent 3506 (121.2) 603 (47.8)
CW-inconsistent 3686 (169.4) 548 (27.3)
CW-consistent 3667 (161.3) 557 (35.6)
First-pass regressions out (%)
RW-inconsistent — 9.8 (1.9)
RW-consistent — 10.2 (1.8)
CW-inconsistent — 6.8 (1.7)
CW-consistent — 8.4 (1.7)
Total reading time (ms)
RW-inconsistent 3583 (137.1) 606 (27.9)
RW-consistent 3700 (121.0) 582 (30.5)
CW-inconsistent 3853 (172.3) 555 (27.3)
CW-consistent 3775 (166.6) 343 (24.9)
Regressions In (%)
RW-inconsistent 21.3 (3.3) 21.4 (2.9)
RW-consistent 20.4 (3.1) 21.9 (2.9)
CW-inconsistent 18.6 (2.6) 19.7 (2.7)
CW-consistent 16.4 (2.5) 12.7 (1.9)
Please cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
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Regions of analysis
Each target sentence was divided into four regions, as
in Experiment 1 and illustrated in (4). Table 4 displays









990 (37.9) 342 (14.3) 921 (41.5)
976 (32.9) 346 (15.5) 1008 (52.6)
960 (52.1) 344 (16.2) 988 (58.2)
931 (40.8) 343 (14.7) 955 (57.9)
1179 (42.1) 421 (20.7) 1426 (95.6)
1218 (53.1) 382 (15.9) 1285 (69.6)
1139 (51.7) 391 (21.6) 1338 (77.8)
1105 (44.6) 392 (19.0) 1193 (62.9)
13.1 (2.0) 14.6 (2.6) 28.2 (3.9)
15.2 (2.7) 8.1 (1.9) 23.6 (3.8)
13.7 (2.0) 8.1 (1.8) 30.3 (3.6)
11.5 (2.0) 10.1 (2.6) 22.3 (3.0)
1298 (52.5) 427 (21.3) 1117 (59.7)
1227 (45.6) 379 (16.2) 1115 (58.2)
1175 (55.6) 399 (19.6) 1125 (56.1)
1109 (40.4) 394 (18.4) 1076 (57.2)
23.9 (2.9) 10.9 (1.8) 4.6 (1.3)
10.9 (2.4) 9.6 (1.9) 3.8 (1.4)
17.2 (1.8) 12.5 (2.1) 2.5 (1.0)
16.2 (2.8) 12.7 (2.1) 2.7 (1.2)
A. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
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ARTICLE IN PRESSFirst-pass reading times. In the critical region 3, no
main effects or interactions were detected [all Fs < 0.2].
First-pass regressions out. Fig. 4 illustrates how each
condition affected the mean first-pass regressions out
of each region as the sentence progressed.
At the critical region 3, a significant interaction
emerged in first-pass regressions-out [F1(1,35) = 4.17,
p = .05; F2(1,31) = 6.23, p = .02]. More regressions were
made out of the critical region following a RW violation
(RW-inconsistent and CW-consistent), regardless of
prior context. The result supports Experiment 1 in that
when the critical word is anomalous with respect to
the real world, there is an early disturbance in the track-
ing record, regardless of whether there is a prior coun-
terfactual context (i.e., CW-consistent). This lends
further support to the argument that at the critical
region, participants automatically process information
in terms of their real-world knowledge.
The post-critical region 4 revealed a main effect of
consistency [F1(1,35) = 4.90, p = .03; F2(1,31) = 5.27,
p = .03], but no interaction [Fs < 0.4], showing that by
this region, there was no longer any interference in terms
of this measure from real-world knowledge in the CW
context case. The two inconsistent conditions (RW-
inconsistent and CW-inconsistent) led to an increased
incidence of first-pass regressions out. These increased
regressions out of the post-critical region are likely to
be due to readers regressing back in the text to attempt
to make sense of the contextual inconsistency. Addition-
ally, it can be noted that, compared to Experiment 1,
this study leads to higher incidence of first-pass regres-
sions out of the post-critical region in all conditions.
We suggest that this increase is due to several factors,
including modification and increase in experimental
items, particularly the removal of ‘continuation’ sen-
tence 3, which may have accumulated ‘wrap-up’ pro-
cesses in Experiment 1.
Regression path times. The pre-critical region 2 revealed





























Fig. 4. Percentage first-pass regressions out, Experiment 2.
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..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jm(1,31) = 5.13, p = .03], with longer reading times follow-
ing RW than CW contexts. The critical region 3 showed
no main effects or an interaction between factors [all
Fs < 3.0]. However, by the post-critical region 4, times
were longer when the critical word had been inconsistent
with the prior context [F1(1,35) = 6.42, p = .02;
F2(1,31) = 8.13, p < .01]. A main effect of context was
also found, that was marginal by participants and signif-
icant by items [F1(1,35) = 3.63, p = .06; F2(1,31) = 4.34,
p = .05]. This effect was largely due to greatly increased
reading times in the RW-inconsistent condition. There
was no reliable interaction between consistency and
CW/ RW [Fs < 0.1]. Thus, by the post-critical region,
CW context is being used without apparent conflict from
CW-consistent condition materials being inconsistent
with the real world.
Total reading times. Similar to Experiment 1, total read-
ing times at the pre-critical region 2 showed a main effect
of consistency [F1(1,35) = 4.21, p = .05; F2(1,31) = 4.03,
p = .05] and a main effect of context [F1(1,35) = 14.08,
p = .001; F2(1,31) = 14.47, p = .001]. Inconsistent condi-
tions led to longer total reading times than consistent
conditions and longer total reading times when the criti-
cal sentence followed a RW context than a CW context.
The consistency effect persists into the critical region 3
[F1(1,35) = 4.22, p = .05; F2(1,31) = 4.23, p = .05], and
an interaction between conditions, significant by partici-
pants and marginal by items, emerges here
[F1(1,35) = 5.18, p = .03; F2(1,31) = 2.85, p = .1].
3
Effects reported in these pre-critical and critical regions
were principally led by increased total reading times for
the RW-inconsistent condition and support the sugges-
tion of a larger disruption to the reading process follow-
ing RW inconsistencies. Thus, over later measures of
processing in the pre-critical and critical regions, there
is evidence that readers have integrated the CW context
into their current knowledge as the RW congruent infor-
mation is processed as anomalous following a CW con-
text. Similarly, the RW anomaly is processed as
acceptable within a CW context.
Regressions in. A main effect of consistency was found
at the pre-critical region [F1(1,35) = 12.75, p = .001;
F2(1,31) = 16.75, p < .001], revealing increased incidence
of regressions into the region following contextually
inconsistent than consistent information. Additionally,
a significant interaction between context and consistency
was found [F1(1,35) = 6.16, p = .02; F2(1,31) = 6.40,3 Number of fixations data reflected total reading times with
main effects of context [F1(1, 35) = 9.26, p < .005;
F2(1, 31) = 8.07, p < .01] and consistency [F1(1, 35) = 5.07,
p < .05; F2(1,32) = 5.14, p < .05] in pre-critical region. Consis-
tency effects persisted into the critical region [F1(1,35) = 6.86,
p < .01; F2(1,31) = 4.03, p < .05].
A. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
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ARTICLE IN PRESSp = .02], showing that there were also more regressions
into the pre-critical region when the critical word had
been anomalous to our RW knowledge, regardless of
prior context.
It should noted that across most measures of reading
(namely regressions out, regression path times, total
reading times, number of fixations and regressions in)
the RW inconsistent condition caused a larger disrup-
tion to the reading process than any other condition
(including CW-inconsistent), and suggests that RW
inconsistencies may have a more powerful effect than
CW inconsistencies.
In sum, Experiment 2 showed that world-inconsistent
conditions (RW-inconsistent and CW-inconsistent) led
to later effects of longer reading times, more fixations
and a higher incidence of regressive eye-movements
around the critical noun than world-consistent
conditions (RW-consistent and CW-consistent). This
supports findings from Experiment 1 that prior context
is rapidly comprehended so that words are processed
in terms of that counterfactual world, thus leading to
clear inconsistency effects. In addition, an early
disruption was observed in response to critical words
that violated real-world expectations, regardless of prior
context (RW-inconsistent and CW-consistent). Such
effects were revealed by lengthened first-pass reading
times on the critical word in Experiment 1, but in the
present study, they were characterised by an increased
incidence of regressive eye-movements from and around
the critical region. Consequently, we can also claim that
RW inconsistencies were detected earlier than CW
inconsistencies, as effects of the CW inconsistency were
revealed later in the eye-movement record, in regressions
from the post-critical region and total reading time
measures.
Thus, the results from Experiment 2 allow us to reject
the possibility that the effects in initial reading measures
are due to priming in the CW conditions, as this effect is
still clear when the critical word has been primed by the
same critical words in CW and RW conditions. This
decision is supported by existing literature (Altarriba
et al., 1996; Rayner & Well, 1996; Schustack et al.,
1987) showing that contextual priming leads to shorter
reading times, while our results show increased first-pass
reading times in the CW-consistent condition.4 The higher number of filler items in Experiment 3 is
attributable to larger experiments serving as filler items for this
study.Experiment 3
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to confirm that the
early effects for RW violations can be replicated, and
also to further investigate the role of the modal verb in
the critical sentence. Experiments 1 and 2 used an
‘If. . . then. . .could. . .’ construction to create counterfac-
tual scenarios. However, it was considered that since
could expresses a conditional possibility or ability, itPlease cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jmmay imply that a few options are available to the situa-
tion, and therefore lends more to a counterfactual inter-
pretation. For example, if a cat were hungry then we
could feed it bowl of carrots but it would walk away dis-
dainfully. Therefore, Experiment 3 used the modal verb
would to express that the event is a repeated or habitual
action. The use of an ‘If. . .then. . .would. . .’ composition
should draw stronger associations to real-world expec-
tancies. Thus, we examine the strength of a counterfac-
tual context and whether contextual consistency effects
can still be identified under these conditions.
Method
Participants
Thirty-six participants from the undergraduate popu-
lation of Glasgow University took part in the study for a
small payment. Participants were selected according to
the same criteria as in Experiments 1 and 2 and addition-
ally they had not taken part in Experiments 1 or 2.
Materials and design
Thirty-two experimental items were used in this
study. A 2 · 2 within subjects design crossed two context
conditions with two consistency conditions, as described
in Experiment 2. Here, the modal verb could in the crit-
ical sentence was replaced by would to investigate the
strength of a counterfactual context on comprehension.
Additionally, since Experiment 2 found that the early
disruptions to the reading process following RW anom-
alies (regardless of context) were not due to priming in
the CW conditions, Experiment 3 used the original
RW context design from Experiment 1. An example
experimental item is shown in Table 5.
Length and frequency of the critical nouns were
matched across conditions. Mean frequency was 79.0
occurrences per million words for the RW-inconsistent
and CW-consistent conditions (mean length = 5.8 char-
acters (min = 3, max = 10)) and 65.5 for the RW-consis-
tent and CW-inconsistent conditions (mean length = 6.0
characters (min = 3, max = 11)).
One version of each item was assigned to one of four
lists for the eye-movement monitoring stage of the
experiment. The items were displayed alongside 152 filler
sentences of various types.4 At least 1 filler item inter-
vened between each experimental item. Comprehension
questions occurred after half of experimental (i.e., 16)
and half of the filler (76) items. Participants did not
receive feedback for their responses and scored at or
above 90% accuracy on the comprehension questions.A. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
l.2007.06.007
5 Data from number of fixations reflects total reading times,
with an interaction at the critical region [F1(1,35) = 9.97,
p = .003; F2(1,31) = 4.06, p = .05] and a main effect of consis-
tency at the post-critical region [F1(1,35) = 9.11, p = .005;
F2(1,31) = 4.76, p = .04].
Table 5
Examples of experimental sentences (Experiment 3)
RW-inconsistent
If cats are hungry they usually pester their owners until they get fed
Families would feed their cat a bowl of carrots and it would gobble it down happily
RW-consistent
If cats are hungry they usually pester their owners until they get fed
Families would feed their cat a bowl of fish and it would gobble it down happily
CW-inconsistent
If cats were vegetarians they would be cheaper for owners to look after
Families would feed their cat a bowl of fish and it would gobble it down happily
CW-consistent
If cats were vegetarians they would be cheaper for owners to look after
Families would feed their cat a bowl of carrots and it would gobble it down happily
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The eye-tracking equipment and experimental proce-
dure were identical to that in the previous experiments.
Results and discussion
Regions of analysis
Regions of analysis were as in (4), for consistency
with earlier studies. The data were analysed in terms
of first-pass reading times, first-pass regressions, regres-
sion path times, total reading times and regressions in as
shown in Table 6.
First-pass reading times. The critical region 3 reveals a
significant interaction between context and consistency
[F1(1,35) = 12.45, p = .001; F2(1,31) = 5.22, p = .03].
This interaction is led by increased first-pass reading
times following a real-world anomaly, regardless of
prior context and was expected here in light of Experi-
ments 1 and 2. These results provide further support that
the effects of real-world anomalies may be picked up in
measures of very early processing in this experiment.
These data are illustrated in Fig. 5.
First-pass regressions out. Fig. 6 illustrates how each
condition affected the mean first-pass regressions out
of each region as the sentence progressed.
No main effects or an interaction between context
and consistency variables was found at the critical
region 3 (All Fs < 0.3). However, a main effect of consis-
tency was revealed at the post-critical region 4
[F1(1,35) = 5.51, p = .02; F2(1,31) = 6.21, p = .02], with
increased incidence of first-pass regressions out from this
region when the critical word had been inconsistent with
prior context. These increased regressions out are likely
to be due to readers regressing back in the text to
attempt to make sense of the inconsistency. Thus, this
provides evidence that by the post-critical region, partic-
ipants are using the CW context to interpret the text,Please cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jmmaking a real-world anomaly acceptable and real-world
congruent information unacceptable.
Regression path times. No main effects or interactions
were revealed in the regression path measure at any
region (All Fs < 3.66).
Total reading times. Total reading time indicated a sig-
nificant interaction at the critical region 3
[F1(1,35) = 7.40, p = .01; F2(1,31) = 4.33, p = .05]. Sim-
ilar to the first-pass reading time data, this interaction
showed longer reading times at the critical region when
it included a violation of real-world knowledge. This
effect, lasting into later measures, suggests that the use
of would in the critical sentence has led participants to
process the passage according real-world expectancies
for an extended period. The anticipated main effect of
consistency was found at the post-critical region 4, with
longer total reading times in the RW-inconsistent and
CW-inconsistent conditions than in the RW- and CW-
consistent conditions [F1(1,35) = 4.87, p = .03; F2
(1,31) = 4.41, p = .04].5 Thus, by the post-critical region
there is evidence that readers have integrated the CW
context into their current knowledge.
Regressions in. Region 1, that introduced the critical
sentence, showed a main effect of context
[F1(1,35) = 5.76, p = .02; F2(1,31) = 4.00, p = .05]. This
region was more likely to be revisited following a CW
context than a RW context. Later at the critical region,
a main effect of consistency was revealed [F1(1,35) =
3.97, p = .05; F2(1,31) = 4.96, p = .03], with more regres-A. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
l.2007.06.007
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First-pass reading time (ms)
RW-inconsistent 2710 (125.4) 471 (26.1) 779 (35.0) 302 (9.2) 861 (50.0)
RW-consistent 2699 (137.0) 465 (22.1) 785 (37.0) 288 (10.9) 845 (43.4)
CW-inconsistent 2736 (130.8) 462 (21.1) 766 (39.9) 285 (10.4) 893 (41.0)
CW-consistent 2816 (146.6) 483 (23.2) 766 (39.8) 324 (11.4) 870 (44.5)
Regression path time (ms)
RW-inconsistent 2710 (125.4) 513 (33.4) 892 (43.5) 358 (15.5) 1119 (64.0)
RW-consistent 2699 (137.0) 496 (26.4) 877 (45.1) 338 (16.4) 1089 (74.7)
CW-inconsistent 2736 (130.8) 518 (26.1) 868 (43.8) 344 (21.0) 1158 (62.6)
CW-consistent 2816 (146.7) 517 (26.1) 901 (39.3) 367 (14.5) 1063 (62.2)
First-pass regressions out (%)
RW-inconsistent — 3.3 (1.2) 9.1 (2.0) 10.7 (2.3) 22.2 (2.3)
RW-consistent — 3.3 (1.2) 7.8 (1.8) 12.3 (3.2) 17.1 (3.1)
CW-inconsistent — 5.1 (1.3) 8.3 (2.0) 11.3 (2.6) 24.1 (3.7)
CW-consistent — 4.2 (1.1) 11.0 (2.0) 11.9 (2.4) 17.9 (2.7)
Total reading time (ms)
RW-inconsistent 2782 (130.5) 526 (30.4) 944 (47.7) 360 (17.0) 972 (50.9)
RW-consistent 2781 (143.0) 518 (26.0) 919 (48.3) 327 (14.4) 940 (52.7)
CW-inconsistent 2842 (133.5) 529 (23.9) 916 (45.7) 327 (13.4) 994 (47.6)
CW-consistent 2899 (154.6) 544 (26.0) 916 (41.3) 353 (11.1) 928 (48.7)
Regressions In (%)
RW-inconsistent 8.8 (2.0) 12.5 (2.1) 19.8 (3.0) 12.7 (2.6) 0.7 (0.5)
RW-consistent 9.6 (2.2) 11.3 (2.2) 13.2 (2.3) 8.0 (1.9) 0.7 (0.5)
CW-inconsistent 13.9 (2.2) 15.6 (3.0) 15.6 (2.6) 8.1 (1.8) 0.6 (0.4)
CW-consistent 10.0 (2.3) 17.4 (2.5) 13.5 (2.5) 6.1 (1.6) 0.7 (0.5)





























Fig. 6. Percentage first-pass regressions out, Experiment 3.

























Fig. 5. Mean first-pass reading times in critical region for
Experiment 3, showing standard error bars.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSsions into this region when the critical word had been
inconsistent with the prior context.
The findings in the present study follow those from
Experiments 1 and 2. Lengthened reading times at the
critical region following a real-world anomaly provides
further support for an initial processing mechanism
using real-world knowledge. Nevertheless, readers
quickly accommodate input to the CW context when
one is present. The effects of real-world knowledge arePlease cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jmlonger lasting in Experiment 3, extending into total read-
ing times and number of fixations at the critical region.
We propose that this is due to the use the modal verb
would to introduce the real-world/counterfactual event.
This prolonged effect was anticipated as would suggests
that an event is a repeated or habitual, therefore, repre-
senting stronger associations to real-world expectancies.
However, the fact that counterfactual world consistencyA. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
l.2007.06.007
14 H.J. Ferguson, A.J. Sanford / Journal of Memory and Language xxx (2007) xxx–xxx
ARTICLE IN PRESSeffects were still identified under these conditions pro-
vides further evidence that a prior CW context plays
an integral, if delayed, role in comprehension.General discussion
Processing counterfactual information requires the
comprehender to reason within a model that is false with
respect to reality. At the same time, it is necessary to
know, or to be able to retrieve easily, the fact that the
model does not reflect reality, but is an alternative to
it, otherwise reality and fantasy would become con-
founded. At the outset of this paper, we asked whether
a CW context would completely remove any trace of a
CW-consistent statement being problematic for reading,
even though that statement would not make sense with
respect to the real world (e.g., You could feed your cat
carrots). In the reasoning literature, Markovits (1995)
pointed out that an initial problem for people presented
with counterfactual premises is that these have to be rep-
resented without interference from knowledge of the real
world. In normal comprehension, world knowledge is
rapidly and automatically recruited to aid interpretation
at levels ranging from the lexical (e.g., Rayner, 1998;
Rayner & Frazier, 1989; Sereno, Brewer, & O’Donnell,
2003) to the level of situations (e.g., Bower, Black, &
Turner, 1979; Cook & Myers, 2004; Garnham, 1979;
Garrod & Terras, 2000; Rizzella & O’Brien, 2002; see
also Sanford & Garrod, 1981, 1998). Classic work has
shown that many errors of memory for passages are
due to the enrichment of a mental representation of
the text by normally appropriate world knowledge
(e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Bower et al., 1979). Sanford and
Garrod (1981; 1998; Sanford, 1983; Sanford, & Moxey,
1999) have proposed that the mapping of incoming dis-
course onto existing world knowledge is indeed an auto-
matic, central process, and that without such mapping,
rudimentary understanding is impossible. According to
their view, it is relating a necessarily fragmentary lan-
guage input to our understanding of situations that con-
stitutes interpretation, and the richer the mapping, the
better the understanding. Frith (1989) termed the ten-
dency to bring real-world knowledge to bear on any lan-
guage input Strong Central Coherence, and has
considered the lack of such a capacity to enrich language
input a potential problem for persons with autistic spec-
trum disorder (Frith, 1989; Happe´, 1997). It has been
argued that an autistic failure to imaginatively elaborate
on how counterfactual statements fit with reality may
underlie the autistic person’s ability to deal with certain
types of counterfactual premises (Scott, Baron-Cohen, &
Leslie, 1999). In sum, there is much evidence to suggest
that language input is automatically related to relevant
world-knowledge, and that this may well apply to state-
ments that come into the scope of a counterfactual.Please cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jmIn Experiment 1, we used an anomaly paradigm to
investigate whether the presence of a counterfactual con-
text would eliminate the effects of a statement that was
anomalous with respect to the real world, but which fits
the counterfactual context. The results showed that, ini-
tially, there was a disruption to eye-tracking even when
the anomaly fitted the counterfactual world context,
showing as an increase in first-pass reading time at the
critical point where the anomaly emerged. Shortly after
that, and on measures of later processing, the CW con-
text accommodated the fact completely. Thus within the
limits of the paradigm, language input is indeed tested
against real-world knowledge, even in the presence of
a counterfactual world context. Experiment 2 further
showed that when a fact that does not fit the CW is pre-
sented in the CW context, that too creates a disruption
of processing similar in nature to that obtained in the
RW-inconsistent condition, a result replicated in Exper-
iment 3.
Further evidence for the immediate checking of lan-
guage input against real-world knowledge, even in CW
contexts, was found in both Experiment 2 and 3. In
Experiment 2, the effect of violating real-world knowl-
edge even in a CW context was revealed in the number
of first-pass regressions out of the critical region. An
additional purpose of this experiment was to rule out
the possibility of priming effects influencing first pass
reading times in the four conditions. Therefore, it is pos-
sible that because reality in the RW context was not only
implied, but explicitly stated (e.g., ‘Evolution dictates
that cats are carnivores and cows are vegetarians’) par-
ticipants were more alert to the RW anomaly, causing
them to immediately regress back in the text to make
sense of the anomaly, rather than to seek more informa-
tion at the critical region. In Experiment 3, a similar
effect to Experiment 1 was found, with increased first-
pass reading times on the critical word following a
real-world anomaly. In this experiment, the effects of
the RW anomaly were longer lasting and persisted into
later eye-movement measures of total reading time and
number of fixations. This is likely to be due to the use
of the modal verb would in the critical sentence, which
requires the reader to accept some event as a usual or
repeated behaviour under given conditions. Conse-
quently, it is believed that this should draw stronger
associations to real-world expectancies. However,
regressions and later effects in the post-critical region
revealed that contextual information, though delayed,
was used to process the passages. Regardless of the fact
that the effects occur across slightly different measures of
reading in the three experiments, the statistical analyses
led to robust effects on early measures of reading
(extending to later measures in Experiment 3), at the
same critical region in all three studies. Therefore, we
consider the results reported here to support a dual, pos-
sibly two-stage, discourse comprehension process (CookA. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
l.2007.06.007
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ras, 2000; Sanford & Garrod, 2005).
Clearly, when the use of a word violates real-world
knowledge, this creates a very early effect upon reading,
while contextual information influences later discourse
resolution. Thus the basic underlying claim, that lan-
guage input is tested initially against real-world knowl-
edge even in the presence of a CW context, appears to
hold. This effect could, in different ways, fit with both
a mental model theory and a suppositional theory of
counterfactual conditional processing. Specifically, the
mental model theory suggests that people hold in mind
the factual possibility that cats are carnivores and there-
fore do not eat carrots and the counterfactual possibility
that cats are vegetarians who do eat carrots. Thus access
to either mental space is possible. Additionally, within
the mental model theory of conditionals, Santamaria,
Espino, and Byrne (2005), show that a counterfactual
conditional statement primes both factual and counter-
factual possibilities whereas a factual conditional primes
only the real-world possibility. The effects reported here,
where RW-inconsistent information takes longer to pro-
cess than CW-inconsistent information, support the idea
that both possibilities are primed by a counterfactual
context while only one is primed by a factual condi-
tional. This suggests that some degree of conflict
between reality and the counterfactual world is occur-
ring in a counterfactual scenario. In contrast, the suppo-
sitional theory predicts that during the context sentence,
readers temporarily add the counterfactual possibility to
their store of beliefs by creating a model through a pro-
cess of minimal change to reality. Later processing of
events following this context sentence are then depen-
dent on whether that event (e.g., eating carrots) is con-
sistent with the available model. In cases where an
inconsistency is initially detected, the suppositional
account suggests that participants must refer back to
the CW context to evaluate whether it would fit with
the alternative world. Accordingly, the early interference
caused by RW violations might reflect this extra stage of
processing in the case of counterfactuals. It is also inter-
esting to note that given a particular minimal change,
some consequents may be easier to infer from the coun-
terfactual state of affairs than others (e.g., cats eating
carrots given the CW that cats are vegetarians). This
gives rise to an interesting test of the suppositional the-
ory, as the closeness of the counterfactual to reality will
affect the construction of a counterfactual world repre-
sentation. Consequently, the presence of early effects
on processing of real-world violations within a counter-
factual context could be predicted by the suppositional
model in relation to the distance of change to reality.
In comparison, the mental model theory does not make
such predictions based on closeness and thus far con-
tains no explanation for the processes by which readers
create a counterfactual and factual model. However, thePlease cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jmexperimental items used in these studies were not con-
structed to enable a systematic analysis of counterfac-
tual closeness effects on comprehension. Therefore,
while this is an interesting issue for future study we feel
that involvement in such a debate is not justified here. In
sum, we do not commit to either of these theories, only
that clearly, for a full understanding of a counterfactual
statement, readers must create a representation of both
reality and the counterfactual alternative.
A two-stage process of discourse resolution has also
been reported by Garrod and Terras (2000). Their study
investigated the contribution of purely lexical semantic
factors (e.g., that write implies using a pen) compared
to more general contextual factors (e.g., writing on a
blackboard). They suggest that initial processing of
a word is driven by the lexical link between a verb and
a dominant role-filler. Thus, dominant role-fillers, such
as the pen, are integrated automatically with previous
material about writing, whereas non-dominant role-fill-
ers, such as the chalk, are not and rely on a later process.
Further, this early integration process is not influenced
by the context in which the role was introduced. Thus,
writing on a blackboard is just as effective for initial inte-
gration of the pen as is writing a letter. Prior context
makes an important contribution only at the later sec-
ond, resolution, stage. The experimental items in the
current studies used unbiased verbs to introduce the crit-
ical sentence (e.g., feed could imply either carrots or
fish). According to Garrod and Terras, the noun in the
critical sentence should not influence initial processing.
Thus, in terms of lexical priming, feeding a cat should
be equally effective for the initial integration of carrots
and fish. Additionally, the fact that the strength of asso-
ciations can be influenced by changing the modal verb in
the target sentence (Experiment 3) suggests that more
sophisticated language representations are occurring
during the comprehension of counterfactuals. On this
basis, we believe that the effects reported here, with an
early disruption to the reading process following a
real-world anomaly, are a genuine consequence of access
to real-world knowledge and not simply lexical semantic
effects.
Another consideration is the time readers spent pro-
cessing in a CW context. In order to provide a fair test
of the idea that CW contexts would readily accommodate
facts congruent with CW, we took care to introduce the
counterfactual world in a separate prior sentence, and
provided a rationale for the introduction of CW into the
discourse. We considered this to be important because
firmly establishing the counterfactual would be necessary
to fairly answer our initial question. However, the vign-
ettes used in our experiments were very short, and one
question is whether with continued exposure to a counter-
factual world, continued checking against real-world
knowledge would continue. Ultimately, only further
experimentation will tell. Nieuwland and Van BerkumA. J., Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An
l.2007.06.007
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sible in the real world (e.g.,The peanut fell in love) initially
produced the large N400 effect in the EEG commonly
found with such anomalies. However, when a story was
produced in which the peanut was firmly established as
‘‘a character’’, the N400 effect ultimately disappeared.
We believe that this observation fits well with our findings
that real-world inconsistent information can be accom-
modated readily within a counterfactual frameworkwhen
one is clearly provided. Building up the characterisation
of a peanut as an animate, feeling entity is one way of
doing this (and is commonplace in the world of animated
cartoons, for instance). However, it is not at all clear that
these results mean that no check against the real world is
actually taking place. Furthermore, inmany stories, it can
readily be argued that keeping contact with real-world
knowledge is essential. For instance, stories often contrast
what a protagonist believes with what are the ‘‘real’’ facts.
A story based in Holland during the tulip fever period
concerned an individual who believed a valuable tulip
bulb to be an onion, and sliced it up for his lunch (Mogg-
ach, 2000, pp. 209–211). The whole point of the story is
that while in the character’s counterfactual world it was
reasonable to eat the ‘onion’, the tension in the story arises
from the ongoing recognition that he is devouring a for-
tune in the form of a valuable bulb. While there is much
to be explored on this front, it is generally the case that
even in counterfactual worlds, certain constraints of real-
ity have to hold. This has been argued by philosophers of
language (e.g., Lewis, 1981; McCall, 1984; Von Fintel,
2001). The plausibility of this is easy to see at an intuitive
level for the case of the peanut falling in love, discussed
above. When we hear that a peanut falls in love, the nor-
mal range of expected behaviours, feelings, and actions
should follow. There has to be an object of that love (a
real-world fact). And even though the peanut may be able
to move about, at least some of the real-world rules of
physics will constrain possiblemovements. Indeed, within
a literary framework, Ryan (1991) has provided a thor-
ough analysis of what constraints from the real world
have to hold in fictional worlds as a function of genres
of writing. In short, mappings from the real world to the
counterfactual world are inevitable if reasoning is to be
generally possible, and for this reason, we would expect
to be able to detect involvement of real-world knowledge
evenwithin the context of the build-up of a counterfactual
scenario.
Evidence has also been provided which implies that
processing strategies are different for real-world and
counterfactual-world information. The fact that RW
inconsistencies are detected immediately in the eye-
tracking record, extending into later measures, with
lengthened reading times and increased regressions,
implies that readers are seeking more information
around the critical region following RW-inconsistent
items, perhaps re-evaluating the model or reparsing thePlease cite this article in press as: Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford,
..., Journal of Memory and Language (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jmtext. In contrast, Experiments 1 and 3 reveal that while
the CW-consistent items also lead to initial problems in
processing with lengthened reading times at the critical
region, increased regressive eye-movements do not
accompany this disruption. Thus, the slowed reading
following CW-consistent conditions may reflect extra
time required to integrate the counterfactual context.
For example, a real-world situation develops strong
expectations towards a real-world event, thus any viola-
tion of those expectations is likely to cause immediate
and comprehensive reanalysis. In contrast, a counterfac-
tual-world situation might produce ‘digging-in’ effects
involving a series of attempted attachments to semanti-
cally relevant CW expectancies, which may in turn com-
pete with typical attachments to RW expectancies.
Tabor and Hutchins (2004) have suggested a similar
model applied to syntax, where reanalyzing text becomes
harder the more committed the parser has become to a
particular syntactic choice.
To conclude, in three experiments we have shown that
when a new counterfactual situation is asserted, people
will readily assimilate new input into this situation. If a
fact fails to fit the counterfactual world, then it disrupts
eye-tracking. If the situation depicted is part of the real
world, then a subsequent input that fails to match leads
to a similar disruption of eye-tracking. Most interesting,
however, is the finding that just prior to the accommoda-
tion of a proposition into a counterfactual world repre-
sentation, the proposition is rapidly evaluated against
real-world knowledge. This has the effect of delaying
accommodation in the counterfactual world case. We
conclude that even in the setting of a counterfactual
world context, evaluation against real-world knowledge
takes place, and have argued for the rationality of such
a process. Finally, the very early influence of situation-
specific information provides some very good evidence
for the general argument that language comprehension
is founded on the fast access to world knowledge.Acknowledgments
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